previously recognized harms of vote dilution and malapportioned districts.6 Even when a Shaw violation occurs, each citizen's vote is still worth the same amount as every other citizen's; white voters do not suffer because the district unfairly prevents them from electing the representative of their choice. In other words, plaintiff s in Shaw claims do not suffer any cognizable harm tied to election results, but rather feel only the "expressive" injury of being subjected to a racial classification in and of itself.7
Nonetheless, Shaw-type lawsuits have proliferated. Since the Shaw decision, courts in several states have subjected to strict scru tiny8 congressional districts in which race constituted the "dominant and controlling" consideration9 and largely have struck them down.10 During the past two years, the Supreme Court has struck down majority-minority districts in Georgia,11 North Carolina,12
[Vol. 95:1404 and Texas;13 lower courts also have struck down such districts in Louisiana,14 New York,15 Florida,16 and Virginia.17
Now that courts staunchly have entered the thicket of racial ger rymandering, they are beginning to face the difficult task of provid ing appropriate remedies. Principles of federalism and separation of powers initially require federal courts to afford states a meaning ful opportunity to cure defective districts by adopting new redis tricting plans.18 Yet once federal courts have interjected themselves into states' redistricting controversies, many states have found themselves too politically paralyzed, or politically unwilling, to en act remedial plans -thus defaulting this duty back to the federal courts.19
These courts are then faced with a thorny question: What prin ciples should guide federal courts in redrawing racially gerry mandered districts? It is well settled that federal courts charged with the "unwelcome obligation" of curing a redistricting violation must alter the state's original plan only as necessary to cure the constitutional defect20 while deferring, as much as possible, to all (1996) . In Texas, for example, Republican governor George W. Bush, Jr. refused to call the Democratic-controlled state legislature into session, apparently calculating that fellow Republicans would be better served by a remedial plan drawn by the district court composed of three Republican-appointed judges, one of whom, Circuit Judge Edith H. Jones, had previ ously served as general counsel for the Te xas Republican Party. See Ve ra, 933 F. Supp. at 1344; see also Pamela S. Karlan, Th e Righ ts to Vo te: Some Pessimism About Fo rmalism, 71 TEXAS L. REv. 1705, 1730-31 (1993) (discussing state political actors' incentives to stonewall, and detailing maneuvering by Alabama's governor, in hopes of more favorable plans from courts). In Louisiana, the court took the duty of redistricting upon itself after the state sub mitted three consecutive plans that the court deemed unconstitutional. See Hays, 936 F. legitimate state policies -such as respecting traditional political lines, protecting incumbents, and avoiding vote dilution -embod ied in the original plan.21 Yet these seemingly straightforward di rectives can dissolve quickly when federal courts attempt to apply them to the "expressive harm"22 caused by a racial gerrymander.
The problem is that any attempt to cure Shaw's expressive harm forces a court to redraw district lines, an action that imposes very concrete consequences on a state's political landscape.23 To put the conundrum succinctly: Just how far can a federal court go in affect ing electoral outcomes when its purpose is to cure only appearances and motivations?24
If the answer is to be judged by the actions of the first few fed eral district courts to address the issue, the answer would appear to be "pretty far." Despite the fact that Shaw injuries purport to have nothing to do with electoral outcomes or partisan gerrymandering, all three courts that have drafted congressional redistricting plans as remedies for these racial gerrymandering violations have altered dramatically the political landscape of the states at issue, in terms of both trampling states' policies of protecting incumbents and alter ing the partisan balance of states' congressional delegations. In Texas, after striking down three districts as unconstitutional racial gerrymanders,25 the court redrew thirteen districts -invalidating already-held primaries in each of those districts -significantly al tered the partisan balance in two of those districts, and moved two 21. See, e.g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795-97 (1973) . 22 . For an explanation of the nature of "expressive hanns" under Shaw, see infra text accompanying notes 78-88.
23. As the Court itself has noted, "it requires no special genius to recognize the political consequences of drawing a district line along one street rather than another." Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) ; see also 412 U.S. at 753 ("The reality is that districting inevitably has ... subst .
antial political consequences."); Kristen Silverberg, Note, Th e Illegiti macy of the Incumbent Gerrymander, 14 TEXAS L. REV. 913, 920-21 (1996) (highlighting the relevance of district lines).
24. Decisions following Shaw have insisted that the constitutional violation at issue stems from state legislatures' improper motivations (that is, their excessive reliance on race), a violation of which bizarre appearance is relevant but not dispositive evidence. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. a. 2475, 2486 (1995); Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 Ct. , 1951 Ct. -52 (1996 (plurality opinion). Despite the Court's disclaimer, however, many commentators -and even some members of the Court -contend that district appearance remains the driving force behind the Court's decisions. See Bush, 116 S. a. at 1962 (plurality opinion) (holding that a dis trict's bizarre shape "is not merely evidentially signifi cant; it is part of the constitutional" hann); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647 (" [W] e believe that reapportionment is one area in which ap pearances do matter."); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts, " and Vo ting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MrcH. L. REV. 483, 536-40, 587 (1993) (arguing that district appearances must be the starting point in evaluating Shaw claims); Pildes, supra note 5 (suggesting that the Court's "predominant motive" test is destined to be reduced to an appearance-based test in order to be administrable). In any event, a court can cure impennissible "motives" only by altering their expressions or appearances. primary winners into new districts.26 In Georgia, after striking down one district, the district court redrew all eleven of the state's districts, placed four incumbents in two districts -thereby creating two open seats -and moved a fifth incumbent into a new district.27 In Louisiana, after striking down one district, the court redrew all seven of the state's· districts, shifting decisively the partisan balance in one district, and altering the majority-minority district so drasti cally that its incumbent, Cleo Fields, decided that it would be futile to run for re-election.2s
These striking results were caused, at least in part, because each remedial court claimed to ignore all "political" considerations in its redistricting plan.29 Granted, if political changes this drastic were At this point, I should note that several ideas in this Note stem from time I spent working on the remedial phase of the Bush litigation, including the Stay Application cited above. In that vein, I am especially thankful to Sam Hirsch, Don Ve rrilli, and Gerry Hebert for their guidance and insights regarding many issues discussed herein. 29. See Ve ra, 933 F. Supp. at 1351 (claiming that incumbents "are entitled to little defer ence in the process of redistricting" and that the court ignored the "partisan impact of its actions"); Hays, 936 F. Supp. at 372 ("[The court's plan] ignore[s] all political considera tions."); Johnson, 922 F. Supp. at 1564 n.10 (stating that incumbency protection was given less weight than other factors because it is "inherently more political in nature"). Thus, it is very difficult to credit the court with the stability of the partisan balance in the Georgia delegation.
unavoidable, regardless of the remedy chosen, these claims of neu trality might have added legitimacy to the courts' remedies. But the troubling aspect of these early decisions is that such excessive polit ical changes did not need to take place; the courts chose to subordinate states' express political redistricting policies to other redistricting criteria, such as compactness and respect for natur�l geographical boundaries.30 Even more unsettling is the fact that the bulk of these critical alterations occurred in districts already de clared constit utional, 31 and that, at least in Texas and Louisiana, the partisan shifts consistently benefitted the same political party, the Republicans. For some reason, these federal courts apparently viewed the states' political considerations in the states' redistricting plans as either not worthy of respect or beyond their institutional reach.
This Note contends that neither of the courts' possible supposi tions is accurate: if a state has expressed a policy of furthering iden tifiable political ends through redistricting, then a federal court can and should respect that policy when it remedies a Shaw violation in that state's redistricting legislation. Part I of the Note defines the expressive harm recognized in Shaw violations, emphasizing that the injury this harm involves district appearances and racial classifi cations, not electoral outcomes. Based on this harm, Part II de scribes the principles that should guide courts in fashioning remedies to Shaw claims. In particular, the second Part argues that, if the state has sought to further political ends through its redistrict ing plan, federal courts should strive to minimize alterations of the state's political landscape. Part III examines the policy conse quences of such a rule. It maintains that requiring courts to con sider the political consequences of their decisions does not cause courts to overstep institutional constraints on the federal judiciary. Rather, it encourages courts to exercise judicial restraint in refusing to alter unnecessarily a state's political status quo.
I. THE HARM CAUSED BY RACIAL GERRYMANDERING
In order to fashion an appropriate remedy for racial gerryman dering violations, one must first understand the Supreme Court's concept of the harm to be cured. As a preliminary step toward productively examining the consti tutional harm that Shaw seeks to address, two points must be made clear at the outset: (1) Shaw claims are not vote-dilution claims; and (2) Shaw claims are not partisan-gerrymandering claims.
Vo te Dilution
The Supreme Court has carefully emphasized that Shaw claims are "analytically distinct" from vote-dilution claims.3 2 In the case of racial vote dilution, plaintiff s, as members of a racial minority, suffer the injury of having the strength of their votes systematically "diluted" on a statewide basis as compared to members of the ma jority group.33 In short, the state's plan harms the plaintiff s because it prevents them from having equal opportunities to elect represent atives of their choice.34 Similarly, in a malapportionment case, the plaintiffs suffer the injury of having their vote diluted because there are more people in their district than in another; thus, each of their votes does not "count" as much as someone's in a district with fewer people.35 These harms strike at the heart of what is consid ered "the right to vote."36 32. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 652 (1993); see also Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2485. 33. Section 2 of the Vo ting Rights Act, as amended, provides the basis for racial "vote dilution" claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994). Section 2 is implicated when, for instance, a state fails to draw a majority-minority district around a reasonably compact and politically cohesive minority population large enough to form the majority of a district, see, e.g., Thorn burg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), or when a state creates a multi-member district in an area where racially polarized voting prevents the election of minority representatives, see, e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
34. See Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1906 (1996) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994)); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 93 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that "electo ral success" is "the linchpin of vote dilution claims"); Pildes, supra note 5. In a very real sense, then, vote-dilution claims are racial discrimination claims.
35. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983); Reynolds v. Sims. 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Karlan, supra note 19, at 1717 (describing the inj ury in malapportionment cases).
The impulse behind Reynolds was a concern for something approximating proportional representation. As Chief Justice Warren explained, "[I)t would seem reasonable that a ma jority of the people of a State could elect a majority of that State's legislators." Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565. This type of harm, however, clearly is not implicated in Shaw litigation. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
36. Cf. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 ("The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society .... "); United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385, 386, 389 (1944) (noting that the right to vote protects against the diluting effect of ballot-box stuffing); Karlan, supra note 7, at 248-49 (describing the "right to vote" as encompassing the ability to participate in and, through aggregation. to affect the outcome of elections).
Yet in Shaw cases, the "right to vote" -in other words, the right to affect electoral outcomes -remains unaff ected. Shaw injuries do not stem from unfair outcomes or unfair processes; by simple logic, plaintiffs seeking the ability to partici pate in a colorblind electoral process could not claim that their right to vote has been impaired because there are too many blacks in their district.42
Partisan Gerrymandering
It is equally clear that the Court views Shaw's harm as distinct from the harm caused by partisan gerrymandering.43 Indeed, this distinction is underscored by the fact that the very plans containing the districts struck down by the Court in North Carolina44 and 37. In North Carolina, for example, whites -who accounted for 78% of the state's total population -comprised the overwhelming majority in 10 of the state's 12 districts (83%). See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 634-35; CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., supra note 5, at 549.
38. In other words, Shaw plaintiffs do not suffer because, in effect, the "wrong" person was elected. See also infra section I.B.1 (showing that Shaw's harm is not related to the representative elected from the district at issue).
39. Indeed, the plaintiffs in , dissenting) (arguing that the "evils of political gerrymandering should be confronted directly, rather than through the race-specific approach that the Court has taken in recent years"). Several commentators also contend that stepping up the political gerrymandering doc trine will more forthrightly and effectively deal with racial gerrymandering than does the Shaw doctrine. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, No Place of Pa rtisan Ger rymandering, TEX. LAW. , Au g. 5, 1996, at 25. Briefly stated, these commentators maintain that because race and politics are so intermingled, "address[ing] the aspect of race alone is both artificial and unduly explosive." Id. In effect, then, the Court's recent decisions really only unveil a subset of partisan gerrymandering. "Rather than polarized debates over race," these commentators contend, "we ought to focus on getting rid of political gerrymandering altogether." Id.
55. See supra note 33 (describing the requirements of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act). 56. Roughly speaking, "packing" describes efforts to place into one district (or a few districts) inefficiently high numbers of voters supporting a particular partisan interest, thereby preventing these voters from altering election results in surrounding districts. 57. A "safe" district is one in which a particular political party has a comfortable majority that essentially guarantees a victory in that district. the time.58 Nevertheless, the Court has determined that it can and will strike down any plan that crosses the line dividing partisan ger rymandering from racial gerrymandering -that is, whenever state legislatures go so far as to use "race as a proxy" for voting pat terns.59 Shaw is concerned only with harm caused by the latter.60
Having focused the discussion on Shaw's particular area of con cern -racial gerrymanders that do not dilute votes -one may proceed to identify the specific injury that Shaw seeks to remedy. This section analyzes the two harms that the Court has discussed, (1) "representative harms" and (2) "expressive harms," and con cludes that only the latter properly encapsulates the Court's view of the constitutional harm that Shaw seeks to redress.
Representative Harms
The majority in Shaw wrote that racial gerrymanders "threaten[ ] to undermine our system of representative democracy by signaling to elected officials that they represent a particular ra cial group rather than their constituency as a whole."61 Such a 59. See Bush, 116 S. a. at 1961-62 (plurality opinion) (striking down districts because "the bizarre shaping and noncompactness of these districts were predominantly attributable to racial, not political, manipulation"); cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 160-61 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (advocating a doctrine under which partisan gerry mandering claims are nonjusticiable, but maintaining that "[r]acial gerrymandering claims should remain justiciable, for the hanns it engenders run counter to the central thrust of the Fourteenth Amendment"). What makes race different? For starters, race, unlike political affiliation, is an immutable characteristic. Moreover, under our constitutional scheme, race based classifications, unlike political classifications, are "inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination .. 60. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1956 (plurality opinion) (holding that "[i]f district lines merely correlate with race because they are drawn on the basis of political affiliation, which corre lates with race, there is no racial classification to justify," and thus strict scrutiny does not apply).
61. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 650 (1993); see also Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2487; Louisiana v. Hays, 115 S. a. 2431, 2436 (1995); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648 ("When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected offi cials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole.").
message might be pernicious, but, for three principal reasons, no harm connected to the actual representation voters receive in Shaw-type districts could be the real harm that Shaw seeks to address.
First, representative harms would apply not only to the bizarrely shaped majority-minority districts to which Shaw speaks, but also to compact majority-minority districts created under the Voting Rights Act -districts to which Shaw does not apply.62 Both types of dis tricts are created with the same level of intent toward ensuring that the given minority has an opportunity to elect a representative of its choice. But while some members of the Court stand prepared to strike down the Voting Rights Act for this very reason,63 at least five Justices have stated unequivocally that majority-minority dis tricts may be created when race does not subordinate other tradi tional districting principles.64 If representative harms were truly the thrust behind Shaw, the Court could not take this carefully articu lated position. It practically would be forced to declare the Voting Rights Act, and every district created under it, unconstitutional. That the Court has explicitly shunned this drastic action suggests that some other harm drives Shaw -a harm not present in com pact, intentionally drawn, majority-minority districts.
Second, claiming that representatives will feel as though they represent only the interests of the minority group assumes precisely the "'demeaning notion"'65 that the Shaw majority says is imper missible: "that members of the same racial group . . . share the same political interests. "66 Moreover, even if the Court could somehow avoid this pitfall, surely a state could not defend a Shaw claim by pointing to evidence that, for instance, the Representative of the district at issue actually furthered white voters' interests at the expense of the African-American or Latino majority.67 Hinging Shaw claims on a Representative's voting record would inject the judiciary into the business of the political branches at an unprece dented level, a level that the Court has demonstrated no previous desire to attain. 68
Third, even when the Court discusses representative harms, it only mentions them as a possibility; such a speculative view of harm, however, has never been enough to satisfy Article Ill's stand ing requirement.69 Consider the following invocations: " [v] oters in such districts may suffer the special representative harms racial clas sifications can cause";70 "a racial gerrymander may exacerbate ... patterns of racial-bloc voting";71 "elected officials are more likely ... to represent only the members of [the majority] group."72 The Court has found constitutional violations without ever saying that any of these representative harms has actually occurred or will oc cur. Thus, if the notion of representative harm has any force, it must be only insofar as it adds to the injurious message that racially gerrymandered districts convey -and not as part of any concrete electoral consequences the districts actually cause. Alternatively stated, Shaw plaintiff s are harmed when the intentional creation of a bizarre majority-minority district expresses that its Representative is more beholden to one racial group than another, but not through any actual failure on the part of the plaintiff s' Representative to 67. See Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 471-72 & n.59 (recognizing that any claims regard ing the quality of representation in challenged districts is irrelevant to the constitutionality of the districts), revd. on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996) .
68. This conception of Shaw's injury would totally remove the harm from the intentions of the gerrymandered district's drafters and from expressions of the district itself -the two places where the Court has exclusively looked to determine liability. See supra note 24. It would also require the Court to resolve a quintessentially "political question." To cite just one other example, hinging Shaw's harm on voting records would produce extreme tension with the plurality's statement in Bandemer (with which Justice O'Connor agreed in her con currence) that "[a]n individual or a group of individuals who votes for a losing candidate is usually deemed to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and to have as much opportunity to influence that candidate as other voters in the district." 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (plurality opinion); see 478 U.S. at 152-53 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (agreeing with this position).
69. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-64 (1992) (requiring dis tinct and palpable, rather than hypothetical or speculative, injury to satisfy Article Ill's standing requirement); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (same). As the Court has explained in the context of the Shaw doctrine itself, "[o]nly those citizens able to allege injury 'as a direct result of having personally been denied equal treatment' may bring [ protect their interests. Otherwise, every disgruntled constituency within a district could press an equal protection claim.73
Perhaps recognizing these infirmities, the Court's recent opin ions have virtually abandoned the idea of representative harms.
Tue Miller Court barely mentioned the notion,74 and in the follow ing Term's cases, Bush7S and Shaw JJ,76 the Court failed even to mention the concept. This abandonment has been a wise maneu ver, for, as the following subsection demonstrates, the only harm that Shaw may attempt to remedy stems from the message that bi zarre districts convey, not from any inequities in representation that they conceivably may cause.
Expressive Harms
Because Shaw is not directed toward curing any purportedly harmful election results caused by racially gerrymandered districts, the harm on which Shaw rests must flow solely from the drawing of the districts themselves. Shaw, therefore, addresses an "expressive harm" -the inherent harm that stems, in and of itself, from a state subjecting its citizens to a racial classification without sufficient justification. 11 Tue idea of an expressive harm can be rather nebulous. Profes sors Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi eloquently encapsulate the concept:
An expressive harm is one that results from the ideas or attitudes expressed through a governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or material consequences the action brings about. On this view, the meaning of a governmental action is just as important as 73. A close inspection of Hays reveals this distinction. Only after the Court held that "the plaintiff has been denied equal treatment because of the legislature's reliance on racial criteria, and therefore has standing to challenge the legislature's action," 115 S. Ct. at 2436, did the Court address representative harms. This demonstrates that "the legislature's reli ance on racial criteria" constituted the real harm through which the potential for, but not the necessity of, representative harms was expressed.
74 This is exactly the principle that drives Shaw. The Shaw doctrine says that even though racial gerrymandering does not cause mate rial injuries, the state violates the Constitution whenever it conveys the message of classifying its citizens by race without a good reason -especially in an area as sensitive as voting districts.
The Justices themselves now refer to Shaw's harm as an expres sive harm,79 and other language in their opinions supports this view. In Shaw itself, the Court worried about " [t] he message that such districting sends,"80 the "perception" that racial classification "rein forces, "81 and the "signal[ s]" racially gerrymandered districts con vey. 82 Subsequent opinions established that this anxiety over the message conveyed by the state's "racial classification" forms the es sence of racial gerrymandering's harm.83 Simply put, the state's un warranted and implied racial classification, in and of itself, is the harm that Shaw seeks to remedy.84
Shaw and its progeny, therefore, hold that, because of the threatening message they convey to a democracy based on equality, 2431, 2433 (1995) (holding that plaintiffs must be "subjected to a racial classification" to have standing under Shaw); 115 S. Ct. at 2437 (stating that "racial classification" is necessary to satisfy standing requirement); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643 ("Classifications of citizens solely on the basis of race are by their very nature odious to .. . equality." (quotation omitted)); 509 U.S. at 649-50 ("Classifying citizens by race ... threatens special harms that are not present in our vote-dilution cases."); 509 U.S. at 657 ("Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society.").
84. even "benign"85 racial classifications in districting are unconstitu tional when unsupported by a compelling justification.86 In the words of Professor Butler:
The message is that the state believes that skin color matters more than all other bases for shared political interest .... For voters of all races it says that blacks have a greater community of representational interest with other blacks hundreds of miles away than they have with people in the community where they live and work.87
In the Court's eyes, a state's purposeful racial classification, ex pressed by a bizarrely shaped racial gerrymander, signals differ ences between the races to a degree that is incompatible with America's goal of equality.88 Thus, even though Shaw-type racial gerrymandering does not cause any electoral or representative harms, its unjustified racial classification itself yields a constitu tional harm that, in the Court's view, requires a remedy. 86. For the Court, no piece of evidence is more convincing of an excessive use of race than the bizarre shapes of the districts themselves. Though the Court has provided somewhat contradictory messages as to whether shape is merely evidence of, or actually part of, the harm, compare Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486 (bizarre shape is merely evidence of Shaw violation) with Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1962 (plurality opinion) ("bizarre shape and noncompactness ...
[are] not merely evidentially significant," they are "part of the constitutional [harm]"), no single factor more pointedly represents the pernicious messages of racial redistricting.
87. Butler, supra note 84, at 340. 88. Therefore, this direct classifi cation present in Shaw cases seemingly distinguishes Shaw claims from "citizen suits" claiming that the state has imposed a racial stigma, like the one present in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) , where the Court has refused to grant standing to sue. Compare Hays, 115 S. Ct. at 2435-36 (discussing Allen) with Allen, 468 U.S. at 766. Such a direct and explicit classification was absent in Allen, at least with respect to the residents within Hays's purportedly unconstitutionally gerrymandered district. Arguably, a direct racial classifi cation signals differences between the races in a way that the indirect tax inducement scheme in Allen did not, and in a way that a majority of the Court now stead fastly refuses to accept. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996) (striking down Colorado's Amendment 1\vo because it was "a classification [of gays and lesbians] under taken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit"); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112-13 (1995) (holding that strict scrutiny applies to all governmental classifi cations based on race).
Under Hays, only citizens residing in the allegedly unconstitutional district have standing to sue. See 115 S. Ct. at 2436. Some commentators have questioned this restriction: If the state's act of classification is the harm, why are only the people within the district classifi ed? See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 74, at 288; Pildes, supra note 5. The Court's response to this concern has been less than satisfactory, but the most persuasive reply is probably that the expressive harms from classification are most directly felt by residents of the district because the bizarre district lines tell members of the racial minority that the state has used their skin color as a proxy for their political interests, while signaling to whites in the district that their presence "is just incidental [-that they] are just the 'fi ller people' needed to comply with one-person/one-vote." Butler, supra note 84, at 340.
II. THE PROPER REMEDY
The current Supreme Court has worked diligently to define nar rowly the role of federal courts in crafting constitutional remedies. As recently as last Term, the Court reaffirmed that well-established "[p]rinciples of federalism and separation of powers impose strin gent limitations on the equitable power of federal courts."89 Our federal system requires that once a federal court has identified a particular harm caused by state action, the fe deral court must limit its remedy to the inadequacy that produced the plaintiff 's injury.9o Consequently, in the words of Justice O'Connor, the Court has con sistently refused to give "federal courts a blank check to impose unlimited remedies upon a constitutional violator."91
Nowhere do these principles of judicial restraint have more force than in the context of redistricting. Therefore, this Part ar gues that, in remedying Shaw violations, federal courts should strive to alter the offensive district lines that express the Sh aw harm with out upsetting states' overall political compromises contained in states' redistricting plans. Section II.A describes the Court's appli cation of the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers to redistricting, highlighting its emphasis on judicial restraint in reme dying redistricting violations. Section II.B explains the importance and legitimacy of states' political policies, namely, protecting in cumbents and establishing a particular partisan balance, which states often further through redistricting legislation. Section II.C contends that the Court's principles of judicial restraint in remedy ing faulty redistricting plans require federal courts to strive to pre serve the essence of states' political policies in crafting remedial plans that cure racial gerrymandering violations.
A. General Principles
Since the federal courts' entry into the redistricting arena,92 the Supreme Court consistently has advocated a policy of judicial re straint in remedying redistricting violations. Drawing electoral dis tricts is in many ways the quintessential act of state sovereignty; it represents the ultimate interaction and compromise between a 107. This is especially true when a federal court is charged with the task of correcting one or two districts in a plan that was recently enacted by the state's legislature. Such has been the case in all Shaw violations to date. When a plan has become malapportioned because of a new census (as happens at each new decade), and the federal court must draw a new plan because the state has proven unable to do so, a federal court may have slightly more leeway because the state polices embodied in the old plan are a bit more stale. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Golder, No. 91-2314C(7), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5894, at *33-*34 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 4, 1992) (utilizing increased discretion in drafting plan where no legislatively adopted plan was before the court). Nevertheless, a federal court should still recognize that, under principles of state sovereignty, somewhat dated state policy still has far more authority than policy created by a federal court.
In Georgia, the federal district court added yet another twist to attempts to measure the bounds of federal authority in redistricting. There, the court attempted to avoid the con straints of Up ham and We iser by claiming that influence applied by the U. (1996) . Nonetheless, the plan with the unconstitutional district eventually passed Georgia's legisla tive process, and it is difficult to understand how a federal court, in creating its own plan, could surmise more accurately the will of the state of Georgia.
Of course, remedial courts are bound to respect all legitimate state policies, 10s not just political ones. There will be instances, then, when preserving political choices conflicts with furthering other state policies. In these situations, federal courts should pay close attention to the state's redistricting plan. If the state's plan demonstrates that political considerations played a dominant force in its drafting,109 courts remedying Shaw violations should give those political choices at least as much respect as they regularly give to other state policies.
Partisan Balance
As flatly stated by Justice White, "[t]he reality is that districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political conse quences .... [Those who redistrict] seek, through compromise and otherwise, to achieve the political or other ends of the State."110 Make no mistake: under the winner-take-all system that districting imposes, slightly altering district lines can have enormous -and decisive -consequences on the outcomes of contested elections and policy decisions.111 Robert Dixon described this precept well:
The key concept to grasp is that there are no neutral lines for legisla tive districts. No matter how the lines are drawn -whether by a ninth-grade civics class or a group of Ph.D.'s or a computer specialist -every line drawn aligns partisans and interest blocs in a particular way, unlike the alignment that would result from putting the line somewhere else.112
Hence, it is nearly impossible to overstate the prevalence of parti san politics in redistricting.113 State legislators invariably fight 108. See supra section II.A. 109. Courts could garner such evidence both from the plans' legislative histories and from the political appearances and realities of the plans themselves.
110. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753-54 (1973); see also White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795-96 (1973) ("Districting inevitably has sharp political impact and inevitably political decisions must be made by those charged with the task.").
111. As the Court aptly summarized in Gaffney: [I]t requires no special genius to recognize the political consequences of drawing a dis trict line along one street rather than another. It is not only obvious, but absolutely unavoidable, that the location and shape of districts may well determine the political complexion of the area. District lines are rarely neutral phenomena. They can well determine what district will be predominantly Democratic or predominantly Republi can, or make a close race likely. 412 U.S. at 753; see also Alfange, supra note 51, at 211 ("Every line drawn on a map to defi ne a legislative district has a political signifi cance -whether the person ( promises] in the course of fashioning relief appropriate to rem edy"1 20 an unconstitutional redistricting plan. Wh ite v. We iser is especially instructive in this regard, because in that case the Court struck down the lower court's remedy based on just this type of judicial overreaching. In an effort to remedy Te xas's malapportioned redistricting plan, the district court had before it two proposed plans that effectively cured the malappor tionment violation: Plan B and Plan C.1 21 Plan B adhered to the basic configurations in the state's original plan, but adjusted district lines where necessary to achieve greater population equality.1 22 The district court, however, chose to implement remedial Plan C because, despite the fact that it "ignored legislative districting pol icy," Plan C's districts were "significantly more compact and contig uous" than Plan B's districts.1 2 3 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "[g]iven the alternatives, the court should not have im posed Plan C, with its very different political impact, on the State."1 2 4
More than a decade later, in the context of asserting the non justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims, Justice O'Connor succinctly stated the principle underlying the Court's policy of judi cial restraint in redistricting: "Federal courts [should not] attempt to recreate the complex process of legislative apportionment in the context of adversary litigation in order to reconcile the competing claims of political, religious, ethnic, racial, occupational, and socio economic groups."1 2 5 From We iser to the present, the best path that federal courts faced with the "unwelcome obligation"1 2 6 of re districting can take is to respect all of a state's permissible political compromises while following the preexisting district lines -as ex pressions of those compromises -as closely as the Constitution will allow. 
In cumbency Protection
Closely related to the practice of balancing partisan interests in redistricting are the well-known practices of protecting district cores of, and avoiding contests between, incumbents. Though this practice seems to some like an overt abuse of power,1 2 7 the Court repeatedly has recognized that incumbency protection is a legiti mate state policy.1 28
Whether or not one likes the practice, 1 2 9 protecting incumbents does serve at least four independently valid state goals. First, it promotes experience in the legislature and enhances the quality of the state's representation in Congress.13 0 Second, bipartisan incum bency protection promotes stability by preventing small swings in the popular vote from having large effects on the composition of a state's congressional delegation.131 If every district had essentially equal numbers of Republicans and Democrats, a narrow margin in the popular vote could cause swings in a state's delegation far in excess of the shift in voter preferences. By responding to this dan ger, "[safe] districts provide assurance that particular points of view will always be represented" in Congress.13 2 Third, because the in-127. See, e.g., Silverberg, supra note 23, at 927-29 (arguing that political gerrymanders undermine the legitimacy of our government and deny voters the right to cast a meaningful vote). It is somewhat difficult, however, to discern any constitutional argument in Silverberg's complaint. The right to cast a "meaningful" (as distinguished from an "equally weighted") vote certainly has never been thought to be a constitutional right. Her concern over the legitimacy of our government is well founded, but, under our fe deral system, it is difficult for a federal court to say that this overcomes states' legitimate, self-serving reasons for engaging in this practice. Perhaps this explains why the Supreme Court has declined invitations to prevent incumbency protection.
128. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 Ct. , 1954 Ct. (1996 Additionally, courts have interpreted Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, see supra text accompany ing notes 47-50, as saying that courts should avoid placing more than one incumbent in a district. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 24, at 579; Silverberg, supra note 23, at 934. But the desirability of this interpretation has been questioned by some commentators. See, e.g., Is· sacharoff, supra note 49, at 1672 (lamenting that "[t]he doctrine born of the desire to curb self-serving manipulation of the process by incumbent powers has been transformed into a constitutional guarantee of sinecure for the pre-existing power base of those incumbent forces").
129. For a sampling of the arguments against incumbency protection, see Grofman, supra note 5, at 115, and lssacharoff, supra note 49, at 1672 n.145.
130. See Alfange, supra note 51, at 226-27; Robert G. ternal rules of the House of Representatives put a substantial pre mium on seniority for purposes of allocating power, continued incumbency provides concrete benefits to the states of the favored representatives.133 Fourth and finally, protecting incumbents safe guards constituent-representative relationships that have been built up over time.134 While reasonable minds can disagree on whether these justifications should carry the day, it is extremely difficult to maintain -and, therefore, the Supreme Court never has -that states act impermissibly when they seek to protect incumbents to further these goals.
C. Application to Shaw Remedies
When states seek to advance political choices regarding partisan balance or incumbency protection through their redistricting plans -which they nearly always do -federal courts remedying dis crete Shaw violations within those plans should respect states' choices. Because the harm caused by racial gerrymanders has noth ing to do with partisan or incumbency-related effects of decisions made by states, 135 federal courts lack both the power and the au thority to affect such state-enacted policies. They should strive to alter only "racial" district lines, while affecting the state's political choices as minimally as possible. 1 36
It might seem rather obvious that federal courts cannot use Shaw violations as an excuse to "remedy" perceived political ineq uities in states' redistricting plans -especially when the plans have been expressly upheld against partisan gerrymandering chal- 135. See supra section I.A. 136. Of course, there will be times when remedial courts will be unable to avoid altering the political balance of the state. All that this Note advocates is that courts implement a plan that alters the state's political balance to the least extent possible while still curing the Shaw violation. This seems a modest tenet. In Te xas, however, a less politically disruptive plan was dismissed in federal court without any finding that the plan inadequately cured the Shaw violation at issue. See Ve ra v. Bush, 933 F. Supp. 1341, 1351 (S.D. Te x. 1996) (stating that the Court began with the proposal submitted by the Lieutenant Governor and the Speaker of the House -which remained largely true to the state's political choices -but then, without finding that plan infi rm, critically "adjusted the plan with an eye toward smoothing the boundaries"). The Georgia court also rejected a less politically disruptive plan, but did so under the somewhat dubious claim that that plan would have violated lenges.131 But this principle of judicial restraint extends further. Federal courts also should not be able to escape their duty to re spect states' political choices by simply "blinding" themselves -in order to avoid complaints of partisanship -to the political conse quences of their remedial plans.13s Whether or not remedial courts admit it, their plans will alter to some degree (the question is how much) a state's political landscape in the most fundamental of ways. Because of the enormous impact that the composition of districts can have on a state's benefits and policies, redistricting represents a federal court's intrusion into the state's political sovereignty at the most basic level. In undertaking such a delicate task, should we not ask more of federal courts than allowing, or requiring, them to "ig nore"139 the consequences of their actions?140
Ye t this is exactly the early trend demonstrated by the first three courts to remedy Shaw claims. Virtually without explanation, these courts ignored explicit state policies of protecting incumbents141 and preserving cores of existing districts,14 2 even altering the parti san balance of two states' congressional delegations,143 in favor of 142. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483 (observing that Georgia has a state policy of attempting to preserve the cores of existing districts); Te xas Stay Application supra note 26, at 21-22 (noting that nearly 1.5 million people were placed into new districts under the court-imposed plan).
143. See supra notes 26, 28 and accompanying text (regarding the courts' redrawing of district lines in Texas and Louisiana). drawing more compact districts and "smoothing boundaries"144 -all despite the fact that the bizarre districts themselves demon strated nothing if not that these states did not favor compactness over political considerations.145 Further, these courts did this in the face of far less politically disruptive plans.146 In point of fact, these federal courts made conscious decisions to subordinate states' polit ical concerns to other, more sterile, redistricting criteria.
In attempting to explain themselves, these Shaw remedial courts might have pointed to other courts that have previously refused to consider the political consequences of their remedial plans.147 Those situations, however, were decidedly different. Previous courts that have ignored the political ramifications of their plans were remedying vote-dilution and malapportionment claims, and -144. Ve ra, 933 F. Supp. at 1351. Knowing the relevant law, Georgia's remedial court at least claimed to follow the state's "traditional" districting criteria. See Jo hnson, 929 F. Supp. at 1564. But, in pretending that such criteria did not include political considerations, it is somewhat difficult to understand exactly what the court meant. Perhaps it followed all tradi tional and relevant redistricting criteria, except for political considerations, but that omission is precisely the problem.
145. The courts' preference for "pretty" districts is all the more odd, considering that compactness and like considerations are not constitutional requirements. See Perhaps the most convincing precedent on which a "blind" Shaw remedial court might rely is the remedy from the malapportionment violation in Karcher v. Daggett, 466 U.S. 910 (1983) (mem.). The district court in Karcher, having two plans from which to choose its remedy, imposed a plan on the state that significantly altered the partisan balance contained in the original plan. Despite the fact that the unchosen plan had been truer to the political choices in the original plan, the Supreme Court, three Justices dissenting, refused to stay the remedial order. Notwithstanding the fact that the case did not receive full consideration by the Court, however, this opinion far from supports utilizing the same practice in Shaw reme dies. The plan that the Karcher district court adopted, despite its more severe political im pact, (i) cured a malapportionment violation which tainted all of the state's districts and potentially caused unfair electoral outcomes, and (ii) adjusted a partisan gerrymander that the court viewed as constitutionally suspect -as compared to recent Shaw cases where the plans at issue had already passed partisan gerrymandering challenges, see supra note 46 and accom panying text. See 466 U.S. at 910-11. though one can debate whether or not this justified those courts' blindfolding14 s -these diff erent harms cast their remedies in a de cidedly different light. In those situations, the states' political deci sions had yielded "unfair" outcomes; they had produced inequities in voting which federal law refuses to allow.149 Thus, it could fairly be said that the states' political considerations were not actually le gitimate. Further, the vote-dilution violations infected either the states' entire plans or large portions thereof,150 enhancing judicial authority to alter district lines throughout the states.
These factors are not present in discrete Sh aw violations. Notwithstanding the expressive harm that the faulty district causes, every voter enjoyed, and continues to enjoy, fair representation and equal access to the ballot box. Moreover, every district except the one or two culprits is entirely constitutional.151 By making one dis crete mistake in drafting a redistricting plan -namely, excessively relying on race in drawing some district lines -a state legislature does not forfeit its right and duty to control the state's political pol icy.152 Thus, remedial Shaw courts must view the states' prior polit-148. Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this Note, which is limited to Sha111 reme dies. The point here is that whether or not those courts' blindfolding was acceptable (some thing that appears to be an open question, see supra note 147), such action is unacceptable in Sha111 cases.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35 (describing the harms of vote dilution and malapportionment). Professor Samuel Issacharoff essentially made this point while a student in 1982, arguing that the Court should not leave the resolution of vote dilution to states' political processes:
[S]uch deference is absurd on its face; the vindication of voting rights can hardly be trusted to the very representatives whose election is the result of the alleged vote dilu tion. If the Court is motivated by a genuine wish to encourage the political settlements of the historic and ongoing effects of discrimination, it can do so only by first ensuring that blacks have adequate access to the political process. Note, Making the Violation Fit the Remedy: Th e In tent Standard and Equal Protection La111, 92 YALE LJ. 328, 346 (1982) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
150. When courts strike down congressional redistricting plans on vote·dilution grounds, they typically strike down the plan as a whole, rather than striking down a particular district as in Sha111 claims. Indeed, the very idea of congressional vote-dilution assumes that a minor ity's voting power is unfairly diminished on a statewide, or at least a large-scale, basis. See Karlan, supra note 7, at 250-51 (describing vote-dilution claims in terms of aggregating votes on a statewide level). Thus, every district, or nearly every district, contributes to the redis tricting violation. This distinguishes vote-dilution judgments from Sha111 decisions which strike down only one or a small number of districts and uphold the rest. See, e.g., Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1345 (S.D. Te x. 1994), affd. sub nom. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 Ct. (1996 .
151. Indeed, persons may challenge on racial gerrymandering grounds only the particular district in which they reside. See United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995). Of course, because unconstitutional districts share boundaries with constitutional ones, it is necessary to alter the lines of constitutional districts in order to remedy the unconstitutional ones. But the point is that Shaw remedial courts should strive to alter as few districts as possible. More importantly, such a practice should be done with care not to disturb unnecessarily the polit· ical considerations manifested in the constitutional districts. See supra note 31 and accompa nying text.
152. This principle holds especially true when a fe deral court has decided to redistrict a state because it is not practicable to allow the state legislature an opportunity to remedy the ical decisions as legitimate. Simply put, when a state's legitimate political decisions are enacted through a lawful process, federal courts remedying Shaw violations must respect, not ignore, the political will of sovereign states.
Furthermore, even if federal courts could overlook allowable state policies in order to preserve some notion of political neutral ity, an additional concern exists. Even accepting for the moment the dubious claim that courts can fully "blindfold" themselves to the political consequences of their Shaw remedies, 153 there is strong reason to believe that blind Shaw remedies nonetheless almost al ways will favor the same side of the partisan struggle: the Republi cans. Ignoring states' political choices in order to preserve judicial "neutrality" will , in fact, not yield neutral results at all.
In states like North Carolina, Texas, and Louisiana, bizarrely shaped majority-minority districts are not necessary to create safe minority districts, but "rather result from Democratic efforts to limit the partisan effects of redistricting" in compliance with the Voting Rights Act.154 When, in the 1990s round of redistricting, the Vo ting Rights Act required certain state legislatures to create addi tional majority-minority districts, Democrats preferred less com pact districts because they more efficiently dispersed the large numbers of dependably liberal voters that would be contained in Shaw violation. See Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978) (plurality opinion) (explain ing that federal courts should defer to states "whenever practicable"). But this idea still holds force in the more common case: when, after having part of its original plan struck down, a state is unable to pass a new plan and defaults the duty of redistricting back to the federal court. Even then, the federal court should draw its plan based on the last duly-en acted state plan. A simple analogy demonstrates that this makes sense. If, after a referee disallows points in a game, the two sides suddenly disagree on the score, the equitable solu tion is to go back to the last score on which the teams agreed, not to go back to zero-zero.
153. Many commentators have expressed serious doubts that this can be, or is ever, done. See Alfange, supra note 51, at 206 (asserting that it is unlikely that the drafter of a plan would not discover the partisan effects of her plan before implementation); Tr anscript, Th e Goldwa ter Ins titute and the Fe deralist Society: Fe deralism and Judicial Mandates, 28 Aruz. ST. L.J. 17, 47 (1996) (comments of Professor Daniel Lowenstein, UCLA Law School) ("[I]f you believe that federal judges go about deciding redistricting cases without regard to their own political views and partisan preferences, there's a bridge in New Yo rk that I'd like to sell you."); see also supra note 111. Such blindfolding seems especially dubious when practiced by local district courts which have a substantial knowledge of the local politics and geography.
154. Pildes, supra note 54, at 1390; see also Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (not ing that a "politically mindless approach may produce, whether intended or not, the most grossly gerrymandered results"); supra text accompanying notes 54-58. Moreover, Demo crats may favor less compact districts in general. Political science literature suggests that drawing more compact districts favors Republicans over Democrats because dependable Democratic voters tend to be more highly concentrated in cities, and therefore more suscep tible to "packing." See, e.g., J. Morgan Kousser, Shaw v. Reno and the Real Wo rld of Redis tricting and Representation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 625, 637 n.47 (1995); Martin Shapiro, Gerrymandering, Unfairness, and the Supreme Court, 33 UCLA L. REV. 227, 237-38 (1985) . Although some have questioned this finding as insuffi ciently supported, see, e.g., Polsby & Popper, supra note 5, at 334-35, no one has offered any evidence to rebut its intuitive appeal.
extremely compact majority-minority districts.155 This allowed the Democrats to promote the reelection prospects of Democratic in cumbents in districts adj acent to the majority-minority districts by preserving the Democratic cores of those districts. 156 Democratic-controlled state legislatures therefore typically fash ion less compact districts to protect their political interests -yet when they draw these bizarre lines according to race, a Shaw claim results. (Republican-controlled legislatures faced with the same Voting Rights Act requirement do not have this problem: they gen erally seek, for equally partisan reasons, simply to pack all of the minority and other dependably liberal voters into compact districts -districts that typically splice the cores of preexisting Democratic districts.157 But because the districts are compact, Republican legis latures' equally partisan tactics and results evade Shaw litiga tion.158 ) Hence, the upshot is this: whenever remedial courts randomly alter lines surrounding bizarrely shaped majority-minor ity districts, common sense should tell the courts that, in curing ra cial, not partisan, injuries, they are far more likely to be favoring partisan Republican interests than Democratic interests.159
That the consequences of courts' willful blindness are far from random or unpredictable should give any equitable jurist pause, es pecially when the partisan balance of the state's plan already falls within constitutional bounds.16° Ye t some commentators argue that even though blindly drawing more compact districts may favor Republicans, this should not affect courts' remedial calculus.161 If one party is helped or harmed more by compact districts, they con tend, this is a "purely fortuitous result"; it should not detract from the worthy goal of "fairer" districting.16 2 This criticism, however, essentially begs its own question. It assumes that when the two conflict, compactness is a "fairer" districting criterion than, for in stance, proportional representation. But some notion of propor tional representation is precisely the concern that underlies gerrymandering's purported illegitimacy. Thus, if compactness helps to defeat the very principle of equal representation it is designed to vindicate, it must be subordinated to broader goals of the political process. While some of the plans at issue in Shaw cases are substantially Democratically gerrymandered beyond propor tional representation, the need for federal courts to respect states' distributions of political power -rather than imposing their own preferable distributions through norms like compactness -prevails nonetheless. If courts want to take on partisan gerrymanders, Shaw remedies are not the place; courts should do so only under a direct doctrine that scrutinizes and punishes both parties to the same degree.163
As a final matter, some may question the ability of courts to preserve the partisan balance enacted by a state legislature.164 To be sure, districting has become a very sophisticated enterprise. Ye t
160.
See supra text accompanying note 46 (noting that Te xas's and North Carolina's plans had passed partisan gerrymandering challenges).
161. See, e.g., Polsby & Popper, supra note 5, at 336. 162. See Shapiro, supra note 154, at 240, quoted in Polsby & Popper, supra note 5, at 336. Specifically, Professor Shapiro maintains that the result is fortuitous because it is "unforesee able by either party when it chose its ideologies and clienteles." Shapiro, supra note 154, at 240. Yet such a claim seems debatable at best. In America's primarily two-party system, the competing political parties are constantly refashioning their messages to appeal to constitu encies in order to produce the most effective results for the party. Does Professor Shapiro really think that the dispersion of "swing" voters in districts escapes the parties' notice?
163. See infra section III.B (presenting this alternative). 164. See MARK E. RusH, DoES REDISTRICTING MAKE A DIFFE RENCE? 54, 135-36 (1993) (questioning legislators' ability to enact effective partisan gerrymanders because people fre quently switch political parties and actually vote for individuals, not parties). This claim, however, seems to overstate the argument; surely certain plans are more beneficial to partic ular parties than others. In fact, modem technology allows drafters of districts to see imme diately the partisan makeup, based on recent election returns, of any proposed district. See Issacharoff, supra note 115, at 1259 (noting that today the partisan consequences of redistrict ing plans are "fully predictable"); supra note 5 (noting technological advances). These num bers generally hold true over short time spans. To give just one example, Democratic congressmen in Te xas alerted the district court to the fact that, based on 1994 statewide elec tion returns, the court's remedial plan shifted the partisan balance in District 5 from slightly Democratic to 53% Republican. See Te xas Stay Application, supra note 26, at 22-23. In the 1996 congressional election between two first-time candidates, Republican Pete Sessions took over District 5 with 53% of the vote. See Results of Contests, supra note 26, at B19. difficulties in redistricting should not relieve courts of their duty to try to respect state policies. Insofar as a federal court attempts to respect state policies, the court's plan can only gain legitimacy. Fur thermore, courts generally do not draft redistricting plans from scratch. Parties and amici in the litigation normally provide courts with several remedial plans from which to choose. The parties to the litigation are typically intimately familiar with the partisan im plications of different plans, and are sure to alert courts of any ad justments to the state's political landscape caused by proposed plans.165 In many instances, then, courts need only follow the dic tates of Weiser and Up ham and choose the least politically disrup tive plan.166 When faced with more difficult choices, and when specific state policy cannot be discerned from the plans or their leg islative history, courts should use their equitable discretion to strive to avoid favoring any political group more than did the original plan. In the end, though, federal courts do not have to balance every state policy; the state has already done that. Courts must sim ply follow the original lines to the greatest extent possible while striving to avoid moving incumbents or creating any decisive parti san shifts.167 III. CouRTs WEIGHING POLITICS: Too DEEP INTO THE THICKET?
Requiring courts to take notice of political considerations may strike one as rather unsavory. Indeed, ever since the Supreme Court's entry into the business of redistricting, the Court itself has been justifiably wary of becoming hopelessly entangled in the "political thicket. 166. See supra ' section II.A. 167. Before moving on, it is worth mentioning that if a fe deral court is remedying a state legislative (rather than congressional) district's Shaw violation, preserving incumbency pro· tection and the partisan balance should hold even more weight. Under this scenario, even if the federal court distorted the importance of other state policies, so long as the court pre served the state's political balance, the legislature, composed of essentially the same interests, could simply correct the federal court's mistakes. If, however, the fe deral court altered the political balance of the state, it would be far more difficult to avoid a more significant intru· sion and effect on state policy.
168. Court has acted carefully to investigate and to weigh political choices of state legislatures only when necessary to vindicate voters' right to fair and equal access to the political process.
This Part contends, however, that this precise principle of avoid ing excessive entanglement in legislative and political business counsels in favor of courts taking notice of and respecting states' political choices when remedying Shaw violations. Only by affirm a tively striving to leave states' permissible political choices intact can federal courts avoid being perceived as unjustifiably meddling in states' legitimate management of their own political affairs. Section III.A examines the appropriateness and institutional competency of federal courts to weigh overtly political considerations, and con cludes that, while this practice is far from entirely satisfying, it is the , most acceptable course to pursue under the Court's current doc trine. Insofar as this solution still proves unpalatable, however, sec tion III.B quickly presents the most viable alternative: fortifying the partisan gerrymandering doctrine, thereby allowing courts to treat some Shaw violations as partisan gerrymandering violations.
A. In stitutional Concerns
The institutional concerns over federal courts taking notice of, respecting, and replicating states' political choices in redistricting legislation fall into roughly two categories: (1) whether such a prac tice would provide undeserved legitimacy to often self-serving polit ical compromises; and (2) whether such a practice would represent an unwarranted entry into the territory of "political questions."
Th e Legitimizing Power of Courts
Fe deral courts, and, in particular, the Supreme Court, hold a special place in American society. As Professor Charles Black ex plained, the significance of judicial review goes far beyond mere checks and balances; judicial review also helps to assure the public of the validity of governmental actions.171 By sanctioning govern mental actions in constitutional terms, the Supreme Court, through the virtue it symbolizes, lends legitimacy to such actions in a way that no other institution can.172 Yet this legitimizing function de pends heavily on public confidence in the Court as an apolitical in stitution: "If the public should ever become convinced that the Court is merely another legislature, that judicial review is only a euphemism for an additional layer in the legislative process, the Court's future as a constitutional tribunal would be cast in grave doubt."173 Hence, the danger becomes apparent: requiring courts to take notice of, and expressly to consider, political consequences of redistricting plans may make states' political gerrymandering and incumbency protection seem legitimate, instead of merely not unconstitutional.
There undoubtedly exists a degree of difference between al lowing nakedly political policies because they fail to violate a fed eral right and actively seeking to preserve them in a redistricting remedy. By refusing to strike down severe partisan gerrymanders, for example, the Court does off er a certain measure of (perhaps undeserved) legitimacy to that practice; yet the Court's level of complicity is undeniably higher when it expressly preserves such a situation. Is this slight increase in perceived accountability enough to turn the tables?
Before one condemns active preservation, one should inspect its alternative. The alternative to taking notice of and respecting states' political choices in crafting Shaw remedies is to require courts to blind themselves -assuming that is possible -to the political consequences of their remedial plans. But, as detailed above, blindness cannot avoid the inevitability of political conse quences in redistricting.174 If anything, blindness can only exacer bate political consequences and sacrifice the very neutrality that courts seek to represent by increasing significantly the likelihood that the political consequences of courts' plans will benefit one side, the Republicans, disproportionately -all while the harm that courts are purporting to cure has nothing to do with any message sent by, or any effect resulting from, states' partisan considerations.
There is no perfect answer to this quandary, but the better solu tion is clear. Though it may seem ironic, the best way for federal courts to stay out of the political thicket is for courts actively to strive to preserve states' political considerations when, as in Shaw violations, those considerations are not implicated in the harm they 173. Robert G. McCloskey, The Supreme Court, 1960 Te rm -Fo reword: Th e Reappor tionment Case, 16 HARV. L. REV. 54, 67 (1962); cf. Schuck, supra note 5, at 1383-84 (noting that "the Court's prestige seems to be burnished" in the public eye when it challenges politi cians' self-interest). Phrased in Professor Schuck's tenns, then, the Court must be wary of appearing to aid politicians in pursuit of their own self-interest. are remedying. In other words, when federal courts refuse to dis turb the political compromises of a state, they more effectively "ig nore" politics than when they alter -even blindly alter -a state's political landscape.1 1s
Federal courts should admit forthrightly that redistricting inevi tably has political consequences, and that because this is so, they, as the apolitical branch of government, have the duty to defer to a state's political policies in that practice. While this action back handedly may lend some legitimacy to somewhat distasteful state politics, it will safeguard public respect for a fe deral judiciary that refuses unnecessarily to become involved in political squabbles. 1 76 So long as the Court allows states to pursue political objectives through redistricting, the tenets of fe deralism and separation of powers necessarily trump any institutional argument -no matter how queasy it makes us -and require that federal courts defer to all state policies that are not part of any constitutional violation.
Because Shaw violations fail to implicate the partisan consequences of states' political redistricting policies, federal courts must strive to leave them intact.
175. Federal courts thereby follow the dictates of Wise v. Lipscomb, which emphasized that federal courts remedying redistricting violations, " 'lacking the political authoritativeness that the legislature can bring to the task,' must act 'circumspectly, and in a manner "free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination." '" 437 U.S. 535, 541 {1978) (plurality opinion) (quoting Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977) (quoting Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964))).
Such a practice raises a related concern: if the thrust of Shaw's expressive harm lies in districts' uncouth appearances, see supra note 86 and accompanying text, one might argue that public confidence in fe deral courts would be undermined if courts altered only a few offending racial lines and submitted as a remedy an equally bizarre-looking district. It is true that respecting states' political compromises may result in remedial districts that appear al most as bizarrely shaped as their predecessors. But while these results may not be perfectly desirable, they cannot be avoided.
First, it should be reiterated that a significant strain in the Court's opinions suggests that Shaw's harm is not dependent on the shape of a district. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2486 (1995) (holding that intent, not shape, creates a violation); supra subsection I.B.2 (emphasizing that racial classifi cation is Shaw's harm). Indeed, in the Te xas case, the district court, without challenge from the Supreme Court, upheld several districts that were as bi zarrely shaped as the ones it struck down because those districts allegedly failed to employ racial classifi cations. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 Ct. , 1965 Ct. -67, 1994 At first blush, considering political choices in redistricting ap pears to tread dangerously close to passing judgment on a political question, something the Court has declined to do since its incep tion.177 When federal courts actively consider states' political com promises in the arena of redistricting, which is itself extraordinarily political, one might argue that federal courts enter a territory best left to the political branches of government. Without a doubt, ap portioning political power is the job of state legislatures. But in the case of Shaw remedies, states have already constitutionally appor tioned that power; this Note asks federal courts only to preserve those choices. Thus, as a closer inspection of the political-question doctrine reveals, federal courts curing Shaw violations actually act in accordance with the policy of the political-question doctrine by refusing to alter legitimate political compromises that they lack the constitutional authority to modify. 178 In the words of Justice Brennan in Baker, "the mere fact that [a] suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents a political question. Such an objection 'is little more than a play upon words.' "179 This is all the more true in the case of a remedy -that is, when a suit does not involve a "political right" in the first place, but when a state now seeks protection of its political rights in curing an unrelated unconstitutional racial classification.
At bottom, the political-question doctrine is really a tenet of ju dicial self-restraint, 180 The crux of the political question doctrine counsels federal courts to avoid meddling in questions thought to be inappropriate for judicial control181 -questions, again to quote Justice Brennan, "impossib [ Above all else, federal courts should refrain from meddling in parti san struggles within the political branches of state governments ab sent a showing that those branches have unconstitutionally allocated power or benefits in the first place.183
This requirement of self-restraint describes exactly the situation posed in Shaw remedies. Federal courts are asked to modify a re districting plan which unconstitutionally classifies voters on the ba sis of race, but which is difficult to adjust without treading on political considerations inappropriate for judicial control. This is quite a thorny problem. But in order to make any progress toward an acceptable solution, it is crucial to recognize that, no matter what federal courts say or do, the problem cannot be escaped. Fed eral courts cannot avoid altering states' legitimate political choices by refusing to consider them; creating political consequences from moving lines on a redistricting plan is nearly inevitable.184 That be ing the case, it seems far better to require courts to confront the problem with their eyes open. Only by purposefully seeking to re spect political considerations that -in the context of discrete racial gerrymandering violations -must be deemed legitimate may fed eral courts truly attempt to avoid affecting political choices properly left to the political branches of state government.
B. Th e Vi able Alternative: Reconsider Bandemer
The predicament in which the Court has placed itself is now clear: in remedying racial gerrymandering violations, it should con sider and respect political choices made by state legislatures, re gardless of their potentially partisan flavor. But if this seems too unsavory or untidy for the Court, there is one viable alternative: it could reconsider Bandemer's partisan-gerrymandering doctrine and put some teeth into it. Such reconsideration would allow federal courts to deal with states' self-serving political choices head-on and properly to adjust extreme partisan aspects of states' redistricting plans under partisan vote-dilution challenges, rather than inadver tently and improperly doing so under Shaw racial classification challenges.
of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 90-92 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring), are much less rele vant here. Regarding the former, federal courts encounter this issue only when balancing the equities in the remedial phase of Shaw cases, so ironclad standards need not exist. Certainly, no specific standards for compactness, contiguity, respecting political subdivisions, or pre serving communities of interest exist, and federal courts always weigh each of these factors when drawing remedial plans. Regarding the latter, the restriction of this issue to the reme dial phase of cases will greatly restrict the spawning of new litigation. Moreover, because fe deral courts are required to defer to legislative redistricting remedies, see supra text accom panying notes 95-96, the frequency of appeals will be lesser still.
183. This remains true even when a federal court seeks to replace a state's politically self serving policy with what it deems a "fairer" policy. See supra text accompanying note 97.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
It would be fine, and perhaps even desirable,18s if the Court de cided to strengthen its partisan gerrymandering doctrine in order to modify political consequences of redistricting plans when they de prive citizens of their right to affect electoral outcomes; it just should not take that action, or allow lower courts to take that ac tion, under the Shaw doctrine.186 If the Court is so uncomfortable with the prospect of.legitimizing states' nakedly political redistrict ing objectives, perhaps it should revamp the doctrine that purports to constrain these practices. Indeed, the public may applaud such an increased check on its elected officials.187 But, in the meantime, when federal courts alter these political practices under the guise of remedying Shaw violations -and especially when they alter them largely in favor of one political party -the judiciary abandons the very legitimacy and neutrality it seeks to represent.188
C ONCLUSION
Shaw litigation is entering a critical phase. Now that federal courts are beginning to implement racial gerrymandering remedies -the Supreme Court heard its first two such appeals this Term t 89 While an extended discussion of the desirability of strengthening Bandemer is beyond the scope of this Note, it is important to note that doing so might well allow the Court to deal more effectively with "mixed motive" cases like Bush and Shaw II. In these cases, racial boundaries may often be seen as merely a side-effect (or an ancillary outcome) -but not an antecedent -to political considerations and attempts to comply with the Voting Rights Act, both of which the Court has recognized as legitimate districting policies. See supra notes 9, 107, 116 and accompanying text. Indeed, as Professor Rush has pointed out, because racial minorities vote overwhelmingly Democratic, and because they tend to remain in specific geo graphic locales, see RusH, supra note 164, at 126-29, what -after the fact -appears to be racial gerrymandering is often actually political gerrymandering. By addressing these gerry manders under a nonracial doctrine, the Court could refute current concerns that Shaw pun ishes only Democratic and pro-minority gerrymanders while permitting equally egregious Republican gerrymanders to avoid serious constitutional scrutiny. Strengthening Bandemer also would avoid Shaw's effect of applying compactness criteria only to majority-minority districts, see Pildes, supra note 5, something that, while perhaps justifiable under the expres sive harm doctrine, nevertheless appears somewhat inequitable.
186. Some scholars have argued that the Court's malapportionment doctrine also was largely an attempt to constrain partisan gerrymandering. See Alfange, supra note 51, at 177, 201-03; Lucas, supra note 170, at 801 (noting that partisan political struggles are just beneath the surface of apportionment cases). But, as the fallout from those decisions has demon strated, indirect doctrines of dealing with partisan gerrymandering are insufficient. See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 5.
187. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 188. Cf. Wechsler, supra note 181, at 15-19 (arguing that courts should judge only by "neutral principles").
189. See Abrams v. Johnson, 116 S. Ct. 1823 (1996) (noting probable jurisdiction); Law yer v. Department of Justice, 117 S. Ct. 292 (1996) (same). According to one commentator, the issues in Abrams focused on the lower court's application of the Voting Rights Act to its redistricting remedy. After striking down a plan with three majority-minority districts, the -they must be reminded to adhere carefully to the narrow scope of Shaw's reach. The Shaw doctrine is designed to constrain "short sighted and unauthorized"190 racial classifications in redistricting plans; it is not designed to address the apportionment of political power throughout states. But allowing federal courts, in remedying Shaw violations, to ignore permissible political consi�e:rations that form the core of states' redistricting plans threatens to make the stakes of Sh aw cases inexorably higher.
Because the Court's partisan-gerrymandering doctrine makes it exceedingly difficult to attack redistricting plans on political grounds,191 political parties and interest groups are gaining an in centive to couch partisan grievances in racial terms.192 Absent a requirement that federal courts remedying Shaw violations strive to leave states' political compromises intact, federal courts seriously risk providing such groups with political gains they were unable to achieve through valid state legislative processes or at the polls. Such overreaching by federal courts is difficult, if not impossible, to square with our basic principles of federalism and separation of powers.
Thus, as the Court's doctrine currently stands, federal courts remedying Sh aw violations have no choice but to take notice of and respect states' political policies -even if they appear colored with self-interest -so long as the policies fail to violate any constitu tional norms. If this proves too unsavory to the Court, it should reconsider its position on partisan gerrymandering and deal forth rightly with the problem of partisan vote-dilution. But whatever the Court's ultimate answer, the current practice of self-imposed blindness in crafting Shaw remedies is an escape hatch that leads district court included only one majority-minority district in its remedial plan. Appellants argued that the Voting Rights Act required the court to create a second such district. See Linda Greenhouse, Lower Courts Become Is sue in Redistricting, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1996, at AlO (recounting oral argument). The Lawyer appeal focused on whether a remedial plan accepted by the district court itself violated Shaw and, perhaps more importantly, whether the district court's use of mediation in the settlement process violated principles of federal ism, or the separation of powers. See 65 U.S.L.W. 3282 (listing questions presented). There fore, it appears unlikely that the Supreme Court's opinion in either case will tackle the issues central to this Note. Suits like this lend credence to the popular notion that many Shaw cases are not about race at all, but rather are "vehicle suits" aimed at increasing partisan representation. See Karlan, supra note 19, at 1727-30; Pildes, supra note 54, at 1378-80.
